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Introduction to PURPA and Net Metering 
This article begins with a brief overview of the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”) and its application, then proceeds to a 
constitutional analysis of PURPA under the Commerce Clause and the 
Tenth Amendment to demonstrate the limitations of the Act. The next 
section outlines a sampling of state implementations of PURPA. The final 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
214 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 7 
  
 
section of the article explores net metering, including analysis of the current 
threats net metering faces, the limitations of PURPA to protect net 
metering, possible federal and state actions to further net metering 
protection, and a brief exploration of whether consumers could assert 
property law
1
 protections to self-generated energy. 
PURPA emerged in 1978 as part of the Carter Administration’s response 
to the then-ongoing energy crisis.
2
 The Act aimed to encourage 
development and use of alternate energy sources in the electricity sector 
through FERC-approved “Qualifying Facilities” (“QF”).
3
 QFs enjoy three 
categories of federally conferred benefits: (1) the right to sell energy to a 
utility, (2) the right to purchase certain services from utilities, and (3) relief 
from certain regulatory burdens.
4
 The two types of QFs are small power 
production facilities (those with generating capacity of up to 80 megawatts
5
 
whose primary energy source is renewable) and cogeneration facilities 
(those that sequentially produces electricity and another form of useful 
thermal energy in a way that is more efficient than the separate production 
of both).
6
 The small power production facilities are the primary focus of 
this paper and will simply be referred to as QFs. At the consumer-generator 
level, for example, QFs often utilize personal solar panels—photovoltaic 
(“PV”) cells which are easily installed on rooftops.
7
  
The Carter administration’s intent under PURPA was to encourage 
energy conservation and supplementation of the energy provided from the 
                                                                                                             
 1. An in-depth discussion of Takings and the Due Process Clause is largely outside the 
scope of this paper, but a limited overview is necessary to demonstrate the possible 
relevancy of these avenues for consumer-generator relief. 
 2. Amy Abel, "Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978: A Fact Sheet,” 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICES, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, July 30, 1992 
 3. See PURPA 101 Fact Sheet, SEIA, https://www.seia.org/sites/default/files/2018-
09/SEIA-PURPA-101-Factsheet-2018-Sept.pdf; See also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 
742, 746 (1982) (“The Titles share three goals: (1) to encourage ‘conservation of energy 
supplied by . . . utilities’; (2) to encourage ‘the optimization of the efficiency of use of 
facilities and resources’ by utilities; and (3) to encourage ‘equitable rates to . . . 
consumers.’”) (Citation omitted).  
 4. PURPA Qualifying Facilities, FAQ (last visited February 14, 2021), 
https://www.ferc.gov/qf.  
 5. This is the limit in PURPA, but the limit varies by state. Nat’l Conf. of State 
Legislatures, State Net Metering Policies (November 20, 2017), https://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/energy/net-metering-policy-overview-and-state-legislative-updates.aspx.  
 6. PURPA Qualifying Facilities, FAQ (last visited February 14, 2021), 
https://www.ferc.gov/qf. 
 7. Samuel Moore, Identifying the Pillars of a Pro-Solar Energy Policy: A Multi-State 
Survey of Distributed Solar Energy Generation Laws, 5 ONE J 695, 696 (2020). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol7/iss1/9
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grid with renewable resources.
8
 But to encourage this supplemental 
production, the law required a carrot for the individuals who would be 
contributing to the energy grid because these individuals still had to bear 
the initial investment costs of, for example, purchasing and installing PV 
cells to their roofs. So the act required utilities to purchase the energy from 
the QF producer through the “avoided cost” method: the utilities pay the QF 
at a rate of what it would have cost the utility to generate that same amount 
of energy.
9
 The regulation also forbade rate discrimination against the QF 
“in comparison to rates for sales to other customers served by the electric 
utility.”
10
 Compliance with the purchase requirement commonly appears 
today in the form of “net metering.”
11
  
Congress codified Net Metering in a 2005 amendment to PURPA, the 
Energy Policy Act.
12
 This paper will use the term “net metering” as an 
umbrella phrase for utilities measuring and compensating consumer-
generators for the energy they produce. On a technical level, however, use 
of a net meter is merely one option of exercising avoided cost; it refers to 
usage of a single meter which shows the net consumption of power.
13
 The 
meter, thus, does not measure and separately display the amount of energy 
contributed to the grid and the amount consumed from the grid.
14
 Instead, it 
shows only net usage as a single metric, meaning the meter can actually run 
backward to reduce previously clocked energy usage when the household 
produces more energy than it consumes.
15
  
Another common implementation of the avoided-cost method is through 
use of a bi-directional meter, which can separately measure the power 
                                                                                                             
 8. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, AMERICAN PUBLIC POWER ASS’N 
(last visited February 14, 2021), https://www.publicpower.org/policy/public-utility-
regulatory-policies-act-1978. 
 9. 16 U.S.C. 824(a)(2) (“[W]hich rules require electric utilities to offer to . . . purchase 
electric energy from such facilities. Such rules shall be prescribed, after consultation with 
representatives of Federal and State regulatory agencies having ratemaking authority for 
electric utilities.”). See also PURPA 101 Fact Sheet, SEIA, https://www.seia.org/sites/ 
default/files/2018-09/SEIA-PURPA-101-Factsheet-2018-Sept.pdf. 
 10. In re Joint in re Westar Energy, Inc., 311 Kan. 320, 325 (2020) (quoting 18 C.F.R. § 
292.305(a)(1)(ii) (2019)). 
 11. Various rate-making guidelines apply depending upon QF size, but such intricacies 
are beyond the scope of this paper. See, e.g., 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(5) for further details. 
 12. 16 U.S.C. § 2621 (including the amendments made by the act). 
 13. Mark Durrenberger, Different Types of Utility Meters for Solar, NEW ENGLAND 
CLEAN ENERGY: THE ENERGY MISER (February 15, 2017), https://newenglandclean 
energy.com/energymiser/2017/02/15/different-types-of-utility-meters-for-solar/. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  
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consumed from the grid and the power produced from the house.
16
 Finally, 
there is dual metering, which consists of two non-communicating meters—
usually the original utility meter (measuring consumption) and another, new 
meter measuring how much energy the house sends out to the grid.
17
 Thus 
the separate meters record separate information to provide the two distinct 
metrics of energy produced and energy consumed. 
In practice, local utility companies typically choose which type of meter 
to use to accomplish this process, and most states that have net metering 
policies also specify how the utilities will manage the avoided cost.
18
 For 
example, a simultaneous buy-sell agreement is a cost avoidance model that 
typically utilizes the two-meters method to record both energy used by the 
consumer from the grid and, separately, energy the consumer generated for 
the grid.
19
 The consumer pays for the energy she consumes from the grid 
and the utility company reimburses her for the energy her home feeds back 
into the grid to be used by others.
20
 The catch is the often-used “rate 
difference,” where consumers pay retail rate but utilities only pay the 
avoidance rate
21
—the amount it would cost the utility company to produce 
that same amount of energy using its own industrial facilities to supply to 
the grid.
22
 This system is more advantageous to the energy company than to 
the consumers, who may view the arrangement as unfair since the energy 
companies can then re-sell that excess energy to other consumers at the 
retail rate.  
Net metering sets up an energy exchange, working off the single-meter 
method, which can measure in both directions.
23
 Energy-producing 
consumers have instant access to the electricity they generate from their 
generation equipment while also feeding any excess into the grid; they can 
also draw more energy from the grid when their energy demand outstrips 
their own production.
24
 In a manner of speaking, the energy company still 
                                                                                                             
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. State Net Metering Policies (November 20, 2017), https://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/energy/net-metering-policy-overview-and-state-legislative-updates.aspx 
 19. Wan, Yih-huei, “Net Metering Programs” TOPICAL ISSUES BRIEF (December 1996), 
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/legosti/old/21651.pdf 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
 22. PURPA 101 Fact Sheet, SEIA, https://www.seia.org/sites/default/files/2018-
09/SEIA-PURPA-101-Factsheet-2018-Sept.pdf 
 23. Samuel Moore, Identifying the Pillars of a Pro-Solar Energy Policy: A Multi-State 
Survey of Distributed Solar Energy Generation Laws, 5 ONE J 695, 696 (2020).  
 24. Id.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol7/iss1/9
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pays the energy-producing consumer for the power the consumer produces 
through a credit on the utility bill—and often at retail price rather than 
simple avoided cost.
25
 While this seems more fair to the consumer, it is not 
cost-advantageous for the energy companies (even though they could still 
theoretically resell that energy to other consumers at the retail rate at a near 
zero-loss).  
Now federally codified, net metering looks like the tempting carrot these 
potential consumer-generators need to contribute individually to renewable 
energy production—or so it would seem until further investigation of the 
law. The statute did not require actual implementation, but only that states 
consider implementing the net metering standard.
26
 Is this consideration 
requirement reflective of the statute’s lack of teeth—space yielded where 
the Commerce Clause permits regulation—or is it what enables the law to 
survive Tenth Amendment challenges? 
PURPA Under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment 
FERC v. Mississippi seems to suggest the latter upon constitutional 
examination of a similar provision of the original law (requiring 
consideration of specific rate design schemes for implementing PURPA’s 
regulations).
27
 The Constitution’s establishment of a system of “dual 
sovereignty” between the state and federal governments is more than well 
settled—it is fundamental to our nation.
28
 The Tenth Amendment is 
reflective of this division of power, claiming for the states any power not 
granted to the federal government.
29
 One such plenary power expressly 
granted to the federal government is the Commerce Clause
30
, which 
                                                                                                             
 25. Wan, Yih-huei, “Net Metering Programs” TOPICAL ISSUES BRIEF (December 1996), 
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/legosti/old/21651.pdf 
 26. 16 U.S.C. § 2622(b)(1) (“Not later than 2 years after the enactment of this 
paragraph, each State regulatory authority (with respect to each electric utility for which it 
has ratemaking authority) and each nonregulated electric utility shall commence the 
consideration referred to in section 111, or set a hearing date for such consideration, with 
respect to each standard established by paragraphs (11) through (13) of section 111(d).”).  
 27. 456 U.S. 742, 746-751 (1982). 
 28. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (“As every schoolchild 
learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the 
federal government.”). 
 29. U.S. Const. amend. X. See also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) 
(“The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.”). 
 30. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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Congress enjoys as a plenary power
31
. The interplay of the Tenth 
Amendment and the Commerce Clause creates, in some areas, tension of 
power between the states and the federal government. One notable area of 
tension—attempts by the federal government to commandeer state officials 
to action on behalf of federal agendas and regulatory implementation—
demonstrates where the power of commerce regulation stops short.
32
 
After PURPA passed, the State of Mississippi sued FERC, arguing that 
Titles I and III of the Act were unconstitutional because PURPA was 
beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause and impermissibly preempted 
state sovereignty guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment.
33
 Titles I and III 
encompassed the provisions aimed at encouraging states to adopt regulatory 
practices.
34
 These titles directed state utility regulators to consider adopting:  
 certain federal standards on ratemaking (six variations on 
approaching rate structuring),  
 a second set of standards regarding utility terms and conditions 
(five factors), 
 some enumerated procedures to follow when considering these 
proposed standards, and 
 reporting requirements regarding the consideration of the standards 
(data collection and filing procedures).
35
  
Note, however, the lack of any requirement or mandate to actually 




The Court first addressed PURPA as an exercise of the Commerce 
Clause. The Court found the state’s assertion of purely intrastate 
                                                                                                             
 31. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1894) (“[T]he sovereignty of Congress, 
though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects.”). 
 32. “In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898 (1997), five Justices found that Federalism principles that prevented the federal 
government from requiring state and local governments to enact legislation, and also 
prohibited the federal government from requiring state or local executive officers to 
implement federal law.” Ronald Rotunda, Principles of Constitutional Law, 123 (West 
Academic Publishing, 5th ed. 2016).  
 33. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 752. 
 34. Id. at 746. 
 35. Id. at 746–749. 
 36. Id. at 749–750. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol7/iss1/9
2021]      PURPA: Bastion, Bridge, or Bygone? 219 
 
 
jurisdiction over public utilities unconvincing entirely
37
 because the 
argument “disregard[ed] entirely the specific congressional finding [in the 
act] that the regulated activities have an immediate effect on interstate 
commerce.”
38
 The Court moved on to its holding on the Tenth Amendment: 
squarely within its plenary power, Congress did not invade the state’s Tenth 
Amendment powers, but did create a case of first impression—
“attempt[ing] to use state regulatory machinery to advance federal goals.”
39
 
The Court reduced PURPA to three provisions and analyzed each 
provision in turn for constitutional violations; it held that the only truly 
troublesome provision (the provision requiring electricity utilities to 
purchase electricity at a rate set by the utility) merely provided for judicial 
dispute resolution.
40
 But, this was a sort of dispute resolution state courts 
already engaged in regularly and, furthermore, this was a permissible 




The Court had no concern whatsoever with the mandatory purchase 
agreement because it required only consideration of standards.
42
 Congress 
could, the Court said, have preempted the field of utilities entirely but 
instead chose to defer to state regulation so long as they at least consider 
the federal standards.
43
 The Court found “nothing in PURPA ‘directly 
compelling’ the states to enact a legislative program” in an already pre-
emptible area.
44
 Thus, PURPA avoided Tenth Amendment infringement.
45
 
                                                                                                             
 37. Id. at 757 (“We agree with appellants that it is difficult to conceive of a more basic 
element of interstate commerce than electric energy, a product used in virtually every home 
and every commercial or manufacturing facility. No State relies solely on its own resources 
in this respect.”).  
 38. Id. at 753, 755.  
 39. Id. at 759. 
 40. Id. at 759–60 (“PURPA, for all its complexity, contains essentially three 
requirements: (1) § 210 has the States enforce standards promulgated by FERC; (2) Titles I 
and III direct the States to consider specified ratemaking standards; and (3) those Titles 
impose certain procedures on state commissions.”). 
 41. Id. at 762, 768 (“To be sure, PURPA gives virtually any affected person the right to 
compel consideration of the statutory standards through judicial action. We fail to see, 
however, that this places any particularly onerous burden on the State.”). 
 42. Id. at 765. 
 43. Id. 
 44. The Court did have sympathy for the states’ choice of “either abandoning the field 
altogether or considering the federal standards,” but ultimately noted the Tenth Amendment 
“has been consistently construed ‘as not depriving the national government of authority to 
resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and plainly 
adapted to the permitted end.’” Id. at 766 (quoting Darby, 312 U.S. at 124). 
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While PURPA escaped the ax, the Supreme Court previously invoked 
the Tenth Amendment to strike down a portion of an act requiring states to 
take title of nuclear waste generated within their borders because “the 
federal government could not compel the States to enact or administer a 
federal regulatory program.”
46
 Building on that decision a few years later, 
the Court examined a suit brought in opposition to the Brady Act.
47
 
With the Brady Act, Congress took aim at gun control, looking to 
implement a national background check system on prospective gun 
owners.
48
 Plaintiffs compelled the Court to consider whether the provisions 
“commanding state and local law enforcement officers to conduct” the 
checks and “to perform certain related tasks” violated the Constitution.
49
 In 
other words, the provision compelled a state official to particular action on 
behalf of the federal regulations.
50
 The Court recognized that state officials 
are, of course, obligated to legislate and enforce state law in a manner that 
does not contradict federal laws;
51
 then it recalled the Framers’ rejection of 
“a central government that would act upon and through the States.”
52
 Thus, 
while the Court focuses on the commandeering of state officials to advance 
federal regulatory action, the underlying current of that objection flows 
between the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment.
53
 
Yet the Court left FERC v. Mississippi undisturbed when it decided 
Printz nearly fifteen years later. In fact, it specifically addressed its holding 
in FERC and distinguished it from Printz:  
                                                                                                             
 45. “[The] most that can be said is that the . . . Act establishes a program of cooperative 
federalism that allows the States, within limits established by federal minimum standards, to 
enact and administer their own regulatory programs, structured to meet their own particular 
needs.” Id. at 767 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc. 452 
U.S. 264, 291 (1981)). 
 46. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 ,188 (1992). 
 47. 18 U.S.C. § 922. Commonly known as “The Brady Act.” 
 48. Printz, 521 U.S. at 902. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 904. 
 51. Id. at 913. 
 52. Id. at 919. 
 53. “Even where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws 
requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to 
require or prohibit those acts. . . . The Commerce Clause, for example, authorizes Congress 
to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state 
governments’ regulation of interstate commerce.” Id. at 924 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 
166). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol7/iss1/9
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[S]tate courts cannot refuse to apply federal law . . . [but] that 
says nothing about whether state executive officers must 
administer federal law. As for FERC . . . “this Court never has 
sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to 
promulgate and enforce laws and regulations," . . . and upheld 
the statutory provisions at issue precisely because they 
did not commandeer state government, but merely imposed 
preconditions to continued state regulation of an otherwise pre-
empted field . . . and required state administrative agencies to 
apply federal law while acting in a judicial capacity.
54
 
Where the Court seemingly could have rendered FERC v. Mississippi and 
PURPA void, it instead continued to recognize the delineation between 
writing legislation commandeering state officials to actively enforce federal 
aims and PURPA’s proffering of implementation standards for 
consideration.  
PURPA’s consideration clause, which leaves the door open for state 
regulators to remain in the field, also effectively helped it work around 
potential Tenth Amendment problems. The deliberations in Printz included 
analysis of how the commandeering of state officials to federal purposes 
acts on the democratic process.
55
 PURPA presented the option to write 
federally developed approaches into local state regulatory law; the Brady 
Act instead drove states to act out federal legislation like marionettes.  
The Brady Act would thus have pinned the burden of cost and execution 
on the states and still permitted Congress to take credit for the program 
without increasing federal taxes.
56
 This shifts any potential voter 
dissatisfaction—and potential retribution in loss of votes—squarely onto 
the states’ shoulders. PURPA instead leaves it to the states to determine 
how to best implement the valid federal purpose via state regulation,
57
 
leaving the burden but also the credit. 
A Selection of State Net Metering Implementation 
As of April 2020, more than 2.3 million residential electricity customers 
in forty-eight states and the District of Columbia generated at least some 
energy through solar panels, representing ninety-six percent of net metered 
                                                                                                             
 54. Id. at 929–30 (citation omitted) (quoting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 761–62).  
 55. Id. at 930. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 767. 
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 States have broad leeway to create and implement 
PURPA-compliant statutes, but many of the policies address common 
issues, such as: 
(1) How to compensate rooftop solar owners for the excess energy: 
at the retail rate, or at more or less than the retail rate of 
energy;
59












Logically, rate of compensation is one of the principal considerations of 
policy for both the consumers and the utilities. The end-rate that electricity 
companies charge embraces a range of costs, but “broadly speaking, rates 
are the sum of generation costs, transmission costs, and distribution 
costs.”
63
 Generation costs can fluctuate by season along with demand 
fluctuations, rising with higher demand as the system works to 
compensate.
64
 Transmission and distribution costs include the fixed costs 
associated with the movement of electricity on the grid and include the 
variable costs associated with grid maintenance and operations.
65
 Utilities 
also frequently employ time-of-use pricing, which reflects rate changes 
associated with highest or peak demand periods and seasons—aimed at best 
aligning the price with the actual costs of the electricity.
66
 
                                                                                                             
 58. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., ELECTRICITY DATA BROWSER, https://www.eia.gov/ 
electricity/data/eia861m/xls/net_metering2020.xlsx (This also includes 90,000 commercial 
and industrial electricity customers. The combined amount of electricity sold back to electric 
companies exceeded 175,000 megawatt hours.). 
 59. Josh T. Smith, Net Metering in the States: A primer on reforms to avoid regressive 
effects and encourage competition, Policy Paper 2018.001 (August 2018), 
https://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/net-metering.pdf.  
 60. See Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Programs, (July 2, 
2020) (demonstrating the common categories addressed for every state policy), 
https://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/488.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. 
 63. Jackson Salovaara, Just and Reasonable Rooftop Solar: A Proposal for Net 
Metering Reform, 7 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 57, 67 (2016).  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 68. 
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PURPA mandates that electric utility providers will accept and pay for 
electricity from non-utility generators
67
 but does not specify in detail the 
method for setting the rate. The 2005 EPA amendment simply requires 
electric utilities to “make available upon request net metering service . . . 
under which electric energy generated by that electric consumer . . . may be 
used to offset electric energy provided by the electric utility.”
68
 Utilities are 
likely to argue for paying consumers a true avoided cost for any excess 
energy generated—that is, paying only what it would cost the utility 
company to actually produce the energy using its established infrastructure 
without accounting for the added costs utilities commonly build into rates 
for infrastructure maintenance
69
. Consumers are more likely to argue for 
receiving a retail rate for the excess energy generated and fed back into the 
system because it results in greater savings on energy bills, more cash in 
consumers’ pockets, or greater return toward the initial investment of the 
PV cells. A sampling of state net metering policies demonstrates the 
common considerations and how states handle them.  
Oklahoma 
Oklahoma’s net metering policy was established in 1988 but was most 
recently modified in 2019
70
 with several pro-solar development provisions. 
Oklahoma offers net metering to all classes of customers and, as of 2019, 
places no limit to the amount of energy that consumers may produce.
71
 
Utility companies are required to compensate net generation at the full 
retail energy rate up to the consumption level or energy used at that 
location.
72
 Energy generated in excess of the energy the consumer had 
actually consumed—previously entirely non-compensable—is to be 
purchased by the utility at the avoided energy cost.
73
 The excess now must 
either be paid or credited in the next billing period.
74
  
Oklahoma also increased the maximum net metering participation level 
to 300 kilowatts from 100 kilowatts, but placed a 125% peak load cap on 
                                                                                                             
 67. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3. 
 68. 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(11). 
 69. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(a)(2) (2016).  
 70. Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Net Metering (July 2, 
2020), https://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/286  
 71. Id.  
 72. Oklahoma Corp. Comm’n, Net Metering in Oklahoma: Payments or Credits for 
Consumer-Generated Power (November 2, 2020), Oklahoma.gov/occ/divisions/public-
utility/electric-utility/netmetering.html. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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 If production exceeds that cap, the customers 
might be subject to the different small power producer regulations under a 
separate subchapter. 
One feature of Oklahoma’s regulations is the so-called “Sun Tax,” which 
addresses possible extra rates or surcharges for net metering customers.
76
 
Oklahoma utility companies may file a new tariff if the utility could show 
evidence of subsidization—when a customer might use (pay for) so little 
power so as to not pay the company enough to cover the fixed costs the 
customer causes on the system.
77
 The theory stands on the precedent that 
utilities build these fixed costs into the usage portion of the energy rates 
rather than charging flat fees to consumers to cover the fixed costs.
78
 
However, as of November, 2020, no utility had yet provided sufficient 
evidence that subsidization occurred or to what level it occurred; thus, net 




California is widely known for its aggressive attitude toward 
encouraging and developing renewable energy. California most recently 
updated its net metering policy in 2019 (Net Metering 2.0) to better assess 
and utilize the impact of energy produced by consumers while keeping 
solar power economically viable.
80
 The adjustment also came as a response 
to the previous policy’s implementation of a five-percent cap on total solar 
installations for total peak electricity demand; California’s growth in solar 
energy production was rapidly overtaking that cap.
81
 Given the high cost of 
energy in the state, solar generation is highly popular because California 
                                                                                                             
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. (citing Final Order No. 662059 “In the event OG&E proposes, in the future, a 
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consumers could realize tens of thousands of dollars in electricity cost 
savings over the panel lifetime.
82
  
The original policy was simple: for every kilowatt-hour (kWh) fed into 
the grid, one kWh of credit was applied to the bill at the retail rate for the 
utility-generated energy saved. When the panels produced excess energy, 
the consumer could accumulate the credit to use at a later time when the 
panels did not produce enough to meet monthly use.
83
 The new program 
continues the retail rate credit and proactively prohibits utility companies 
from applying fixed charges (“demand charges, grid-access charges, 
installed capacity fees, and standby fees”) aimed at energy-generating 
consumers.
84
 However, 2.0 allowed for a one-time interconnection fee and 
for non-bypassable charges which were built into the per-kilowatt hour 




California is already in the midst of adopting a third iteration of the net 
metering regulations to go into effect in 2022—some reports speculate the 
newest policy may cut back on the benefits to consumer-generated energy 




Kansas has established net metering policies for the state’s two investor-
owned utility companies, most recently amended in 2014.
87
 Utilities must 
offer net metering and provide bi-directional meters at no cost to the 
customers “until the rated generating capacity of all net-metered systems 
equals 1% of the utility’s peak demand during the previous year.”
88
 
However, local cooperative and municipal electric providers are not 
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Kansas has an expansive inclusion of energy sources which qualify as 
renewable energy resources eligible for net metering; far from just solar, the 
list includes wind, crops grown for energy production, cellulosic 
agricultural residues, methane from landfills or wastewater treatment, wood 
products, hydropower, hydrogen fuel-cells (produced by aforementioned 
renewable sources), and a catchall provision for any energy storage 
connected to any renewable generation.
90
 To be eligible for net metering, 
one must be a “customer-generator”:  
 using any of these renewable energy resources,  
 located on a premise owned by the customer generator,  
 interconnected and operated in parallel phase with an affected 
utility under that utility’s safety standards,  
 intended to primarily offset the customer-generator’s own energy 
requirements, and 




Despite the expansive inclusion, the statute limits net metering to small 
generators—25 kilowatts for residential customers under a pre-2014 
agreement and 15 kilowatts for residential customers under a post-2014 
agreement.
92
 One of the big changes in the 2014 amendment to the net 
metering guidelines was a shift from one-to-one credit for consumption 
(retail rate) to a 100% avoided cost rate credit, based on the utility’s 
monthly system average cost of energy per kilowatt hour.
93
 This change 
allowed pre-2014 agreement customer-generators to continue to receive 
retail rate reimbursement.
94
 But this grandfather clause will phase out in 
2030, and all customer-generators will receive avoided cost bill credit.
95
  
Finally, Kansas’s statute includes a reporting and tracking provision 
requiring the utilities to submit annual information on the net-metered 
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 the utilities may count these facilities toward their 
compliance with the Kansas Renewable Energy Standard.
97
 
Other State Approaches to Net Metering Under PURPA 
While thirty-four states, including the three above, utilize net metering, 
the rest take a different approach. Some states are transitioning to other 
types of compensation. Illinois is set to move to a new process upon 
reaching a 5% aggregate cap and Indiana will phase out retail-rate 
compensation completely by 2022.
98
 Michigan has phased out net metering 
entirely in favor of “cost of service,” which allows utilities to simply 
choose what they want to pay for distributed energy generation.
99
 While 
Michigan’s approach is uninspiring, New York is moving to a value-based 
tariff which aims to accurately compensate distributed generation
100
—
potentially a better avenue than either retail or avoided cost rate net 
metering reimbursement. 
Other states have forms of mandatory compensation other than net 
metering. Hawaii, for example, has two tariffs: one is a credit up until the 
utility’s capacity limit, and the second is designed for smart systems which 
can both generate and store solar energy.
101
 Customers thus use excess 
generation to charge the storage batteries during the day, then consume the 
stored energy at night; any further excess energy exported to the grid 
overnight is reimbursed in a bill credit.
102
 Utah, on the other hand, has 




Georgia, Idaho, and Texas, meanwhile, do not have mandatory state-
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Net Metering Under PURPA: Problems, Potential Federal and State 
Remedies, and Consumer-Generator Property Rights 
Some noteworthy points may be gleaned from our brief look at states’ 
net metering implementations. First, states commonly seem to have started 
their net metering policies using retail rate reimbursement or credit for the 
consumer-generators. However, they appear to be collectively moving away 
from the retail rate toward avoided cost as popularity and the percentage of 
peak energy generated increases among utility customers. Kansas changed 
from retail rate to avoided cost in its 2014 adjustment and Illinois will put a 
new compensation system in place upon reaching a 5% aggregate cap.
105
 
FERC supports the move to avoided cost, because “[w]ith PURPA, . . . 
Congress was not asking utilities and utility ratepayers to pay more than 
they otherwise would have paid for power.”
106
 Logically, such an ask would 
have served to disincentivize utilities from enacting PURPA. 
A second takeaway is that states could still choose simply to either do 
away with current net metering compensation, like Michigan, or to make it 
completely optional, like Georgia. Consumer-generators then must ask what 
sort of assurance any of them has that they will continue to benefit from this 
investment. Kansas policy reveals at least one way states may incentivize 
utilities to want to work with consumer generators by creating a policy that 
allows consumer production of energy to benefit the utilities. Such a 
renewably energy portfolio standard may require, for example, that utilities 
must produce a certain percentage of their energy from qualifying, 
renewable sources.
107
 But it should also allow the utilities to purchase rather 
than produce some of that energy—such as from consumer-generators—to 
satisfy this minimum threshold.
108
 The requirement helps shift the incentive 
from having as few consumer-generators as possible to increasing use of 




Unfortunately, states are still free to choose not to implement net 
metering at all. Short of relying on state policy to cement net metering 
advantages, where else can individual consumers turn to enforce supposed 
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rights under PURPA? The DC Circuit summarized the limited judicial 
options in a 2017 case in which a small QF contested its sales to the local 
utility under PURPA.
110
 The case noted PURPA’s construction: FERC 
creates regulations under PURPA, but the states must actually implement 
the regulations and determine utilities’ avoided cost rates.
111
 PURPA’s 
enforcement provisions only apply to the extent that the state has already 
implemented PURPA, and thus any dispute created by state-implemented 
PURPA rules are a matter for state courts.
112
 Federal courts may only 
adjudicate matters which affect interstate power transmission or wholesale 
generation (under FERC’s Federal Power Act jurisdiction) or in which 
FERC brings certain claims.
113
 This case demonstrates that neither federal 
courts nor FERC has much power to adjudicate suits brought by small QF 
consumers against local utility companies for rights set out under PURPA. 
These consumers are limited to state court relief and only to the extent that 
the states have chosen to implement PURPA’s regulations.  
This narrow avenue for judicial relief recommends consideration of the 
limited power to combat threats to existing state PURPA implementations 
and why Congress is limited in its enforcement of PURPA principles.  
Threats 
This delegation to the states of net metering regulation under PURPA 
also delegates to the states the responsibility to deal with the legal 
challenges and threats to PURPA and net metering. In the states that have 
net metering, consumers face a rise in pushback from utilities as PV cell 
energy generation trends both cheaper and more popular. Consider:  
 Both Utah and Vermont currently face pressure form utility 
providers to continue lowering solar purchase rates, past a point 
of financial feasibility, and Arizona’s state regulators have put 
off a 10% annual rate drop—but only for this year.
114
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 Louisiana outright abandoned net-metering in 2019;115 one Illinois 
utility company ended its net metering policy despite requests 
from the state’s Commerce Commission to delay the move.
116
  
 FERC even faced down—and rejected—a petition by the New 
England Ratepayers Association (“NERA”) which aimed to 
scrap state net metering policies nationwide.
117
 NERA’s 
approach was to force FERC into declaring that net metering 
constituted a sale subject to exclusive federal PURPA 
jurisdiction, but FERC declined,
118
 thus leaving net metering 
policymaking to the states.  
Meanwhile, both the Montana and Kansas Supreme Courts in 2020 stood 
as bastions against the encroaching utilities, ruling in favor of consumers 
and rejecting rate and fee discrimination against distributed solar 
customers.
119
 The Montana Supreme Court rejected the argument that 
protecting the ratepayer (utilities) was the most critical factor in calculating 
avoided-cost; the most critical factor was instead to “preclude 
discrimination in the marketplace for sources of energy that provide an 
alternative to fossil fuel development.”
120
 The utility company sought to 
exclude carbon costs from the avoided-rate cost for small, solar qualifying 
facilities, citing unpredictable federal regulatory actions and the likelihood 
of carbon emissions regulations.
121
 The court held this justification was 
arbitrary: “to assign carbon pricing a value of ‘zero’ because of its 
speculative nature simply does not compensate QFs for the full avoided-
cost rate.
122
 Nor does conjecture about an increasingly hostile political 
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climate” justify the move.
123
 This carbon cost exclusion was thus 
discriminatory to QFs and violated PURPA.
124
  
The court also rejected the utility’s implementation of reduced contracts 
for the solar QFs because it failed to consider the shorter contracts “in 
conjunction with greatly reduced standard offer . . . rates,” resulting in a 
PURPA violation since the contracts must “be sufficiently long term to 
‘encourage’ and ‘enhance’ QF development.”
125
 The court held against 
strategies which aimed to chip away at the consumer-generator side of the 
balance PURPA seeks to strike in incentivizing both utilities and consumers 
to invest in renewable energy resources. While rate-makers have great 
leeway, generally, the court found these particular strategies “arbitrary and 
unreasonable” as well as discriminatory against the QFs in question.
126
 
The Kansas Supreme Court likewise dealt with discriminatory rates set 
by utilities targeting customers who produce at least some energy through 
renewable resource distributed generation.
127
 The court noted a frequent 
theme which utilities raise: the companies traditionally use a “two-part 
rate,” but build some of the fixed costs of delivering energy to consumers 
into the rate charged per kilowatt hours used during the billing period rather 
than including them all in the commonly denoted “flat service charge”.
128
 
Utilities suggest this practice is used as an incentive to encourage customers 
to “exercise prudent energy consumption;” however, it now gives cause for 
the companies to complain of a “free rider” problem.
129
 Distributed 
generation customers still pay the flat service fee but, in some scenarios, are 
able to generate enough energy that their usage bills amount to net-zero.
130
 
And, utilities argue, shifting the costs to other customers who thus subsidize 
the distributed generation customers.
131
 In the instant case, the utility 
company developed a new rate structure to apply to distributed generation 
customers.
132
 The court points out that the utilities chose all along to 
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structure rates in a manner which encourages energy conservation by 
wrapping some fixed costs into the variable charge, suggesting the free 
rider problem was actually created by the utility companies themselves.
133
  
The court noted the economic arguments may have some merit but said it 
could easily dismiss them.
134
 The new proposed rate structure violated 
Kansas law because it was discriminatory to distributed generation 
customers.
135
 The problem with the new proposed structure was that the 
utility added a fee without any added service: the flat fee had no relation to 
“time-of-use rate or a minimum bill,” but is “simply price discrimination” 
based on their being distributed generation customers.
136
 
These two cases highlight two common threats to consumer-advantaged 
net metering. First, as the Montana case suggests, utility companies may 
employ tactics to tip the PURPA guidelines more to their favor than to the 
consumer’s favor. The Montana company tried to exploit technical uses of 
rate determination to its advantage and sought to predict the direction of the 
political winds, betting on future legislation that was less economically 
focused. The Kansas case presented discriminatory pricing that the Kansas 
Supreme Courts could shut down. The Kansas decision showed how courts 
can deal with such tactics and still support PURPA’s intent of encouraging 
renewable resource development.  
The Kansas case also demonstrated the second threat of policy argument 
designed to sway public opinion against net metering. The utility raised a 
policy and economic argument that opponents of net metering champion, 
while also demonstrating the obvious rebuttal. The argument is that 
permitting net metering (or any billing arrangement which allows 
distributed generation customers to offset energy costs via self-generated 
electricity) only serves to benefit the distributed generation customers at the 
expense of traditional customers, low-income customers, and the utilities.
137
 
But this argument only has merit to the extent that consumer generators 
shift enough costs to truly negatively impact non-consumer generators. In 
2019, the annual estimated amount of small-scale PV energy generation 
was approximately 35,000 gigawatt hours (GWh).
138
 The total energy sales 
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for 2019 amount to 3.9 million GWh.
139
 Accordingly, only approximated 
0.9% of the energy demand in 2019 could have been supplanted by 
distributed generation consumers with PV solar, and only a corresponding 
amount of the costs could thus have shifted to non-consumer generators. 
Furthermore, only some of that cost equates to the portion allocated to fixed 
costs which would be shifted since only part of the kilowatt per hour rate 
consists of fixed costs.
140
 As for low-income consumers, the argument 




On the other hand, this cost-shifting argument narrowly excludes 
consideration of the benefits that the consumer-generators confer on the 
grid and other consumers. For example, consumer-generated power reduces 
peak demand, emissions, and the maintenance or repair costs that 
accompany these reductions.
142
 Some cities even pay higher-than-retail 
rates for this excess energy.
143
 Even with this more inclusive approach, cost 
shifting is likely still negligible, though the potential certainly exists for the 
small-scale energy industry to grow to the point at which the costs become 
substantial. In the meantime, as the Kansas Supreme Court rightly pointed 
out, the utility company in the In re Westar case had likely just created its 
own problem by structuring its rates such that the fixed costs of providing 
electricity were not covered by the flat service fees which it permissibly 
charged all of its customers.
144
 Rather than discriminating against 
distributed generation customers, the simpler solution is to better 
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incorporate the actual costs into the flat service fee—which is what the fee 
is designed to cover in the first place.
145
  
PURPA Comes Up Short 
If Congress still aims to promulgate policy supporting net-metering, 
PURPA’s first problem is it does not reach far enough. The 2005 
amendment requires only that states consider implementing policies of net-
metering. As of 2015, most states had implemented net metering policies, 
but some still had not.
146
 Though only a few states hold out, the citizens of 
those states do not have access to benefits of net-metering. 
Printz and FERC viewed together indicate the second problem with 
PURPA: Congress cannot compel the states to implement net metering. 
Comparing the cases, the consideration provision of PURPA stands out as 
its protection from the Court’s Tenth Amendment ax. Congress may 
regulate the commerce of utility providing, but it cannot commandeer states 
directly to act for its purpose. Utilities, though truly connected to interstate 
commerce, still possess intimately local considerations.
147
 If, however, net 
metering indeed is something vital to protecting or promoting the continued 
development of and transition to renewable resources under PURPA’s 
framework, then the federal government has taken the current statute as far 
as it can go under the current Constitutional Limitations. 
Remedies: Constitutional Analysis of Potential Federal and State Avenues 
Both the federal and state governments utilize policy to encourage 
development and expansion of renewable energy.
148
 Without directly 
mandating specific actions, policy is one of the sharpest tools the 
government possesses to promote desired behaviors from its citizens. Both 
levels of government employ tax credits and legislation “requiring utilities 
to purchase renewable energy credits . . . to create financial incentives for 
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[renewable energy] project developers.”
149
 For the small scale projects 
which are the focus of this paper, net metering is the most common 
promotional policy tool.
150
 Keeping in mind the limitations of Printz and 
FERC, as well as the division of regulatory power built in to PURPA’s 
construction, both the federal and state levels of government still possess 
actionable avenues to strengthen PURPA through policy. 
How, then, should net metering protection proceed under the law? One 
option is a federal work-around, either through rewriting PURPA, partially 
or completely preempting the field, or tightening the purse strings. A 
second option is for states to take a stronger stance to protect net metering 
through a property rights analysis and close monitoring of utility rates, or 
merely to continue implementing PURPA as written and allowing the state 
courts to carry the burden of remedying utility company rate discrimination. 
Federal Courses of Action 
1. Legislate a work-around into PURPA. 
The federal government is unlikely to find a workaround path to 
successfully mandate adoption of net metering, per Printz and FERC v. 
Mississippi. But one approach it could take is a simpler exercise of its 
Commerce Power through actual prohibition of rate discrimination against 
solar power users.  
If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in 
question, state law is still pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with 
federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and 
federal law or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
151
 
As FERC recognized—and Printz upheld—utilities are well within 
Congress’s exercise of the Commerce Clause because of the extensively 
interconnected nature of energy among the many states.
152
 PURPA declined 
to fully preempt and toed the line of Tenth Amendment infringement when 
it refrained from compelling action,
153
 but also declined to exercise the 
easily defendable power of prohibition.  
This prohibition on rate discrimination would function as a partial 
preemption of the utility field under authority of the Supremacy Clause. A 
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constitutionally adopted federal law—such as valid exercise of the 
Commerce power—invalidates “any and all state or local laws” to the 
extent such laws conflicts with the federal law.
154
 The move would 
constitute partial preemption because Courts do not entirely exclude state 
regulation alongside federal laws.
155
 Such a prohibition would permissibly 
maneuver the states into regulating accordingly, because state officials have 
to enact and enforce state laws “in a fashion as not to obstruct the operation 
of federal law, and . . . all state actions constitution such obstruction, even 
legislative Acts, are ipso facto invalid.”
156
 Printz endorsed the use of 




Including a statute prohibiting discrimination in rate-setting could 
function as a useful, if only partial, band-aid over the PURPA problem. The 
federal government could preempt utility companies from engaging in the 
previously discussed tactics to discourage the growing popularity of PV 
panels, while still leaving to the states the rest of the regulatory authority 
and responsibility. At least two state supreme courts have successfully 
upheld state PURPA measures prohibiting discriminatory charges,
158
 
indicating judicial viability of the intent. The antidiscrimination measure, 
however, still works best for consumer generators when coupled with net-
metering like a one-two punch. 
2. Preempt the Field Entirely 
As a second avenue, Congress could entirely preempt the field of utility 
regulation in lieu of the partial preemption option. Congress may impliedly 
preempt any state regulation through a “scheme of federal regulation so 
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room to 
supplement it.”
159
 Federal regulation may make federal interest in the field 
“so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude 
enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”
160
 Full preemption renders 
to the federal government the obvious benefit of complete control over the 
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means used to pursue the goal of PURPA (increased renewable energy 
production). Such total preemption would eliminate the wide variation in 
current state net-metering legislation and could set forth a standardized 
application of net metering principals nation-wide. Several FERC decisions 
demonstrate reluctance to expand even its limited regulatory purview, and 
Congress would have to consider questions of how to avoid 
commandeering under Printz if it looked to expand PURPA as a whole. For 
example, what the sheer logistics of full preemption would look like and 
whether utilities are a matter the federal government and courts are 
equipped to handle still remain. 
Presently, FERC creates regulations under PURPA, leaving to the states 
the consideration and implementation (or not) of those regulations, and 
rejecting efforts to shift regulation to the federal level. FERC possesses 
specific regulatory power over wholesale sales of electricity in interstate 
commerce.
161
 In response to the recent NERA challenge,
162
 the 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission filed a protest raising the point 
that the Federal Power Act preserves to the states the jurisdiction to 
legislate the local retail sale of power—and any sale beyond wholesale 
interstate sales, for that matter.
163
 FERC apparently agreed and declined to 
make any sweeping changes classifying QF power sale as wholesale—and 
thus subject to federal regulation—effectively leaving the jurisdictional 
disputes to the states.
164
 Such a declaration would have effectively regulated 
at the federal level the rate utilities are required to pay to consumer 
generators for the excess power fed back into the energy grid by declaring it 
wholesale energy. 








 MidAmerican Energy objected to an Iowa Utilities Board 
order, directing it to interconnect with three “Alternate Energy facilities” 
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and to offer them net metering pursuant to Iowa’s Alternate Energy 
Production Statute.
168
 The company argued (1) MidAmerican did not have 
to pay a rate in excess of its avoided cost because PURPA preempted 
Iowa’s regulation, and (2) Iowa actually had set rates for wholesale power 
sales, for which the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) preempted Iowa’s authority 
because these facilities were not QFs.
169
 It further argued that every “flow 
of power” constituted a sale subject to the pricing requirements of either 
PURPA or the Federal Power Act.
170
 The Iowa Board argued that its orders 
were “permissible implementations of state energy policy,” and thus not 
preempted by or in conflict with either PURPA or the FPA.
171
 
FERC, unpersuaded by MidAmerican’s arguments, declined to find all 
“flows of power” constituted sale; it found no sale when individual 
homeowners and consumers engage in net metering with utilities.
172
 
However, the commission noted that where a QF has a net sale to a 
utility—where a QF has created more power than it has used and receives 




Based partially on the final holding in MidAmerican, SunEdison sought a 
declaratory ruling from FERC to ensure proper jurisdiction and rate making 
in the case of sales of electricity to end-use customers.
174
 The particular 
concern involved somewhat of an electricity merry-go-round: when 
SunEdison generates solar power from its own QF generation subsidiaries, 
sells it to a customer, and pays the same customer in the event that some of 
that power goes unused (under a net metering agreement), does that 
constitute a sale for resale in interstate commerce for purposes of federal 
jurisdiction?
175
 MidAmerican did not stretch so far as to rule out this 
scenario. FERC helpfully specified that a sale subject to its jurisdiction only 
occurs should the end of use customer produce and feed back into the grid 
more energy than it needs over an entire billing period.
176
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SunEdison’s other concern arose from concerns over rate setting: should 
its sale of energy to end-use customers constitute “jurisdictional rates,” the 
“rates accepted, established, or permitted by the Commission for the 
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce[] [and] the sale of 
electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce?”
177
 FERC returned to 
its conclusion that there was not a sale under its jurisdiction in such net 
metering scenarios to assert that jurisdictional rates do not apply.
178
 
In both MidAmerican and SunEdison, FERC asserted straightforward 
demarcations to the specific jurisdictional questions presented. NERA 
sought to overcome both of these cases in its suit seeking a FERC 
declaration that net metering transactions amounts to sales in interstate 
commerce, but FERC still declined to make such a statement.
179
 In its 
answer to the NERA challenge, however, FERC also declined to truly make 




FERC had the clear opportunity to fully preempt regulation of net 
metering as a sale of power subject to federal commerce control, but 
continued to decline to do so. This consistent resistance to asserting full 
jurisdiction over net metering under PURPA makes easy sense in light of 
the restrictions borne of the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment 
interplay demonstrated in Printz and in FERC. If FERC claims jurisdiction 
over all net metering questions under the banner of wholesale energy and 
interstate commerce, PURPA regulations are no longer subject to 
governmental enforcement only as a matter of state implementation. The 
federal government would now own regulation and mediation of net 
metering disputes under federal law. Would the federal government then 
find itself forced to order all states to implement and enforce PURPA-
compliant net metering policies? Possibly. It seems difficult to shut down 
some consumer suits for net metering in states which currently have no 
PURPA-compliant regulations while enforcing the regulation’s application 
in suits brought in states which do. If so, the Printz and the Tenth 
Amendment tension surfaces immediately.  
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PURPA avoids Tenth Amendment infringement because it leaves to the 
states the ultimate decisions on whether and how to implement net metering 
regulations. If the federal government merely mandates PURPA 
nationwide, it removes states discretion and opens itself up to the 
commandeering problems seen in Printz and invites a revisiting of FERC v. 
Mississippi. FERC cannot, of course, coerce state officials to execute a 
federal regulation program. Total field preemption is an option to 
circumvent that problem—the constitutional authority exists to fully 
regulate energy and utilities under the Commerce Clause
181
. 
Obviously, myriad federal programs exist, so transforming PURPA into 
a federally regulated program requires no novel mobilization of resources 
or logistic skill. On the one hand, FERC could have found that net metering 
did constitute a wholesale of energy in interstate commerce, thus regulated 
under the FPA. Rates under the FPA must be “just and reasonable,” but 
FERC delegates much of that ratemaking authority to nonprofit 
organizations in various regional markets.
182
 In New England, for example, 
the organization that oversees market auctions (auctioning demands for 
electricity) sets the wholesale price via the price of the last accepted bid; 
from there, the entities that sell and deliver the energy to the consumers 
derive the retail price to charge for the power.
183
 Thus, even if net metering 
remained grouped under the wholesale part of this process, FERC still 
delegated regulation down to a more practical regional level and potentially 
would not require an extensive change in execution of PURPA.  
This type of reclassification likely circumvents any commandeering or 
Tenth Amendment issue because FERC already regulates wholesale. 
Theoretically, it would simply cause utility providers to have to measure 
and compensate the net metered energy along the wholesale rates. Such an 
arrangement likely satisfies most companies with existing net metering 
because it is a lower rate of compensation than retail rate. In states with no 
current net metering, however, the utilities would have to implement a 
system to handle the now-wholesale nature of the net metered power.  
Alternatively, FERC could find itself forced to take over utility 
ratemaking entirely if it laid claim to net metering with a mandate that 
compensation will always be at the retail rate. While the Court upheld 
PURPA in FERC v. Mississippi, it did so because it “merely imposed 
preconditions to continued state regulation of an otherwise pre-empted 
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 A retail rate could still be a mere precondition; arguably such a 
command does not upset federal versus state accountability since the local 
utilities still determine the retail rates. Or, a retail rate could be a 
commandeering of state policy, overriding the state’s discretion to 
implement PURPA as it chooses. 
Of course, FERC could just take over utilities entirely via regulation that 
is pervasive enough under Pacific Gas so as to remove the state entirely,
185
 
and implement federal officials to take over any positions currently 
occupied by state officials for the purpose of executing regulatory regimes. 
This, however, would force any disputes over energy into federal courts for 
federal judges to deal with.
186
  
3. Tug on the Purse Strings 
A third avenue that remains steadfastly open, with room to enhance 
PURPA, is Congress’s ability to strong-arm or entice states into compliance 
through monetary incentive via congressional spending power. “Congress 
may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds.”
187
 But “such 
conditions must bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal 
spending,”
188
 and cannot be so coercive as to leave states with no real 
choice other than to comply.
189
 Congress could use its power of the purse to 
offer funds aimed at offsetting some of the cost utility companies claim in 
order to require states to promulgate net metering paired with the anti-
discriminatory rate clause. States could be given funds earmarked 
specifically for renewable resource development, conditioned on the 
implementation of net metering policies that comply or closely comply with 
PURPA’s guidelines. 
Alternatively, Congress could condition further receipt of some amount 
of funds already allocated to state budgets to entice the states to act in a 
compliant manner or to offer increased funding to an already existing 
program on basis of such conditions. For example, the Low-Income Home 
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Energy Assistance Program (“LIHEAP”) provides funding to states to help 
offset high energy costs for low-income households.
190
 The program assists 
with costs associated with heating and cooling, weatherization, bill payment 
assistance, and energy-related home repairs.
191
 
Consider, for example, Oklahoma, which will receive $42 million in 
federal funding for its LIHEAP program.
192
 The federal government could 
easily condition a small portion of that budget or offer a small increase to 
that budget in order to entice Oklahoma into implementing PURPA in its 
federally recommended form. If the Supreme Court held that a drinking age 
was closely related enough to highway funding to uphold South Dakota v. 
Dole,
193
 then LIHEAP is certainly one (likely of several) area of funding on 
which the federal government could attach a string related to renewable 
energy. As a matter of policy and optics, offering to increase the funding 
certainly appears better than threatening to withhold any measure of the 
funds since the criticism already implies that net metering disadvantages the 
poor. 
State Courses of Action 
States, of course, are simply free to legislate and regulate for the general 
welfare of their citizens to the extent that federal regulation does not 
preclude state law as discussed in the above paragraphs. While states, of 
course, may choose to implement PURPA in its suggested form, they also 
may (and do) alter the guidelines to better suit their own legislative 
purposes.
194
 While some states have taken advantage of the opportunity to 
reduce net metering guidelines, they could also choose to pursue more 
aggressive policies designed to encourage renewable energy development 
within the state. Some research suggests that the “retail rate” form of net 
metering may not actually benefit solar because it could spark a stronger 
pushback against residential solar.
195
 The same study found that utility-
scale solar actually costs less than residential-scale,
196
 suggesting states 
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might look for ways to push legislation encouraging utility companies to 
aggressively pursue transitioning to renewables on a large-scale. 
 States could, in conjunction with such legislation, offer tax incentives to 
residents who already have an energy generation system to allow the utility 
company to focus the funding on the renewable development instead. Net 
metering stands as a useful interim measure, but states will need to take 
greater, large-scale action to make meaningful strides toward energy 
independence via renewable sources. Kansas, for example, increased its 
wind-produced energy by 270% from 2009 to 2018; by 2018, the state 
produced enough energy from solar, wind, and hydro electricity to power 
47% of the state’s electricity consumption.
197
 Over some of that time 
period, Kansas had a Renewables Portfolio Standard setting percentage 
goals.
198
 Georgia, contrarily, produced only about 9% of its energy from 
renewable sources in 2019, but nearly half of that was derived from wood 
and wood-derived fuels.
199
 Georgia has neither a renewable energy portfolio 
standard, nor a voluntary renewable energy goal.
200
 
Consumer-Generator Property Rights 
If neither federal nor state regulations offer consumer-generators 
protection for the energy they generate, what avenue for recourse might 
they exploit? This final section very briefly touches on whether the 
Constitution provides any defenses for self-generated energy under property 
theory or due process requirements. 
Before applying the Takings or Due Process clauses in protection of 
excess self-generated electricity, courts would likely need to address 
whether consumer-generators have the right to both self-generate power 
and still be connected to the commercial utility system. Common law 
property doctrine supports the right to use renewable resources to generate 
electricity through the right to use and enjoy one’s property.
201
 On the 
federal level, PURPA establishes the right to interconnect these electricity-
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generating facilities with the local utilities—implying the right to also use 
these generation facilities in addition to the utility provided energy.
202
 
However, as discussed in preceding paragraphs, PURPA is an optional 
regulatory scheme. Fortunately, all states have laws establishing “an 
electric distribution utility’s obligation to reliably serve all customers,” for 
which consumers must pay the fixed infrastructure costs and the variable 
rate for the consumer’s energy use.
203
 The implication, per these rate 
structures, is that consumers set the payable level of service via the extent 
to which they request and use the service.
204
 If consumers have the right to 
receive power from local utilities, and to determine how much power they 
do receive, then presumably they also have the right to stay connected to 
these local utilities even if they begin to generate some power for 
themselves. In this case, solar generation to save utility costs is analogous 
to a consumer using a wood-burning fireplace in the wintertime to generate 
additional heat and save utility costs—a use of property none would 
question. 
If consumers may generate power under use and enjoyment of property, 
then the Constitution may provide some protection for the property owner’s 
interest in the generated power—particularly in the excess power which the 
property owner does not use. The Fifth Amendment provides two property 
interest protections under the Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause; 
each involves “subjective assessments of the nature and degree of the 




Under a Takings analysis, courts look to factual analysis of the 
regulation’s economic impact of diminution in value, character of the 
governmental action, and the action’s impact on “reasonable investment-
backed expectations.”
206
 The Fifth Amendment implies that the government 
should only execute a taking of private property for “public use,” but courts 
defer to legislators’ judgment on the matter.
207
 The Supreme Court also 
recognizes a distinction between a “physical intrusion or appropriation of 
property requiring just compensation” and a regulatory taking which yet 
amounts to an appropriation due to the severity of constraints on use of the 
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 Property regulation is presumptively reasonable but “if 
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”
209
 
Due process analysis focuses on legitimate government interests versus 
arbitrary and irrational actions.
210
 Due process requires that the government 
pay just compensation to the owner of taken property.
211
 The just 
compensation is “fairly determined market value”—ascertained on the date 
of the taking and measured by what an ordinary buyer would be willing to 
pay—but is also measured by the owner’s loss rather than the government’s 
gain.
212
 Market value may not command the price determination when it 
would “result in manifest injustice to the owner or the public.”
213
 
Constitutional protections under the Takings or Due Process clauses may 
pass through the utility companies to consumer-generators because the 
government may regulate private conduct when it is “clothed in the public 
interest”—that is, when “the owner by devoting his business to the public 
use, in effect grants the public an interest in that use and subjects himself to 
public regulation.”
214
 Thus utilities are subject to state rate regulation, and 
the rates must be reasonable; courts may find unreasonable rates amount to 
regulatory takings and require just compensation.
215
  
Suits under the Takings theory seem unlikely to garner success for 
consumers, but the best argument likely lies within the reliance interest on 
the consumer’s investment in the generation equipment. “Reasonable 
investment backed expectations” as a standard addresses property owners’ 
ability to use their land as expected in context of new regulation which 
would hinder that ability.
216
 Rather than protect compensation paid for 
excess energy, this theory of law likely would serve to protect consumer-
generators only from regulation seeking to strip property owners of the 
right to generate any electricity at all—and only under a reasonable 
expectation of use and enjoyment of one’s land as a property owner. The 
diminution in value approach sets a high bar to qualify as a taking: to either 
“substantially exceed 50%,” but really decreasing by “closer to 90% of the 
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parcel as a whole before it is likely to result in a taking.”
217
 Unless the 
excess energy produced were severable from the land as a parcel of 
property, the value of that energy will never approach ninety or even fifty 
percent of the parcel value. 
Though not a due process-based suit, the Missouri Supreme Court 
invalidated the local utility’s efforts to squelch distributed generation 
compensation rates as arbitrary or irrational policymaking,
218
 offering a 
more promising recourse for similar suits under Due Process theory. Due 
process examines whether the means justify the ends to determine whether 
there is sufficient purpose in government regulations.
219
 The government 
may not “impos[e] harms that are disproportionately high compared to the 
benefits created,” but the standard is deferential.
220
 The likely path to Due 
Process protection lies in connecting the excess produced energy to 
irrational or unreasonable rates of compensation. Net metering rates still 
carry an end-result presumption of validity, as do all rate-making 
decisions.
221
 Ratemaking is a highly technical, local, and self-correcting 
process best executed by experts in the field—courts may struggle to 
govern cases of rate accuracy.
222
 Courts, however, are practiced in 
determining whether regulations violate constitutional protections and 
whether regulatory actions fall into a category of unreasonable or arbitrary. 
For that reason, courts—like the Missouri Supreme Court—will have no 
trouble continuing to protect consumer-generators from discriminatory, 
arbitrary, or unreasonable regulations, under the Due Process Clause or 
otherwise. However, if consumer-generators want to argue about what 
amount exactly qualifies as just compensation for excess generated energy, 
appealing to legislators through the political process will likely serve them 
better. 
Conclusion 
Net metering has demonstrated its usefulness as a policy tool in 
encouraging private persons to self-produce some of the energy they 
consume using renewable resources harnessed from their own property. 
Currently, the costs this self-produced energy shifts to other consumers on 
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utility grids certainly does not outweigh the policy benefits Congress sought 
to push when it enacted PURPA,
223
 but admittedly the time may come when 
enough energy is produced that the cost shifting becomes substantial. A 
study conducted by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology supports this 
notion, suggesting “utility-scale solar is inherently less expensive than 
residential-scale” and has greater external costs than benefits.
224
 But some 
argue this study is incomplete and “ignores commercial and industrial 
rooftop solar” which often is similar in cost to utility-scale solar.
225
  
Unquestionably, energy sourced from renewable resources is a growing 
industry and policy concern. PURPA certainly has its limitations, but this 
paper concludes that net metering presently remains an important incentive 
and equity tool for the states while they develop and evolve their utilities to 
include renewable energy. States should seek to protect net metering and 
consumer generators while PURPA remains in its current form. This 
protection will remain important while legislatures determine what the 
future of utilities holds and while states work to resolve what a fully 
integrated renewable energy grid looks like. 
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